In South Asia having a religious affiliation makes one normal, like everyone else. One's religious affiliation is simply part of one's identity, perhaps even a necessary part. The idea of having no religious affiliation is difficult to imagine. In broad strokes and the ignoring the many possible exceptions, one can say that, in South Asia, religious identification is an ascriptive characteristic. One is born into a religion and the idea of either denying one's religious identity or changing through conversion to another religion is extremely controversial (see, for example, Schmalz, 2006) . In East Asia, as in Western Europe, however, identifying with a religion is much more of a voluntary decision, though one may, of course, be born into a religious community. Declaring any religious affiliation at all is a decision that involves a willingness to declare oneself different from the societal norm, thus displaying a significant degree of religious commitment. The options of either conversion to a different religion or abandoning religious belief altogether are omnipresent. Religious people may not be directly persecuted or discriminated against but "In large areas of modern Europe, religious men and women who attempt to create new religious institutions or promote religious ideas run into a brick wall of resistance and indifference." (Cox 2003:204) . In Japan, I
am sure, religious activists would recognize this "brick wall of resistance and indifference" as part of their own experience. In several other countries in East Asia one could add yet another brick wall of official animosity. We should therefore expect that being religious would have different meanings in such secularized social environments as opposed to environments permeated by religiosity.
A second question that has proven reliable in eliciting levels of religiosity across cultures and religious traditions is "How often do you pray or meditate?" Again we find a stark contrast between East and South Asia. In Table 2 we see that over half of South Asians answer that they pray daily. The percentage ranges from 53.5 per cent in Pakistan to 86.8% in India but never drops below half. In East Asia, however, the percentage never rises above a quarter. Japan tops the list of East Asians with 22.6 per cent and Korea comes in second with 17.7% but the other East Asian countries all fall below ten per cent. Conversely, the percentage of respondents who answer that they never pray or meditate (analysis not shown) never rises above 4 per cent in South Asia but never falls much below 25 per cent in East Asia. In China and Hong Kong over two-thirds of the population says that they never pray or meditate.
[ Table 2 about here] One obvious explanation for the differences between East and South Asia is the different religious traditions that predominate in each region. One might argue, for example, that South Asians seem more religious than East Asians because more South Asians are Muslim and Muslims are "required" to pray five times a day. In fact, however, the percentage of Muslims that claim to pray daily varies widely across countries. A high percentage of Indians pray daily whether they are Muslim, Buddhist or Christian, not to mention Hindus who cannot be compared with the other nations in our sample.
Over half of Muslims in South Asia but much less than half of Muslims in East Asia pray daily. Country effects are evident and are often more powerful than the effect of religious tradition. If you want to predict whether someone prays daily, you are usually better off asking about where they live than which religion they profess. This finding is echoed in Brechon's conclusions concerning Western Europe: "… while differences between Catholics and Protestants appear in the sample's average …, a detailed analysis of the tables reveals that these differences are almost always have more to do with the national context than with religious affiliation." (Brechon 2003:138 we face a problem of complex interactions between the effects of national culture and religious tradition. To understand the religiosity of any particular group, it is important to understand both the national context and the religious tradition. In some senses, Muslims share a common religious heritage no matter where they live. In other equally important senses, however, Indians, Chinese or members of any other national culture share a common religious heritage whether they are Hindu, Muslim, Christian, or Buddhist.
For present purposes, however, the most important points are, first, that East Asia is a very secularized while South Asia is a very religious environment and, second, that it makes some sense to analyze the phenomenon of religiosity in Asia separate from the religious traditions.
Religion in Secular East Asia
Using the standard measures of secularization, we find that the societies of East Asia are highly secularized. Traditional secularization theory based on the experience of Western Europe (or at least the classic theorizing of European sociologists) would lead us to conjecture that East Asians will have replaced "enchanted" religious style thinking with more modern, rational and scientific modes of thought. That does not, however, turn out to be the case. We asked, "Do you believe in an unseen spiritual world that can influence events in the world we see around us?" Though this question was designed to be a clear affirmation of an "unscientific" belief in spirits, as seen in Table 3 around half of our East Asian respondents answered in the affirmative, rising to 70 per cent in Taiwan. These findings clearly show that high levels of secularization are compatible with relatively high levels of spirituality. In secular East Asia over half (nearly half in the case of China) of the population believes in a spiritual world. Secularization can happen without the widespread adoption of the presumably "scientific" beliefs of a world ruled by knowable natural laws and random chance.
[ Table 3 about here]
This finding echoes those of Norris and Inglehart. They find, first, that "there is no direct correlation at the individual level between faith in science and religiosity." (Norris and Inglehart 2004:64) . At the societal level, they find that "publics in many
Muslim societies see not apparent contradictions between believing that scientific advances hold great promise for human progress and that they have faith in common tenets of spiritual beliefs, … Indeed, the more secular postindustrial societies … prove most skeptical toward the impact of science and technology, …" (Norris and Inglehart 2004:67) . Secularization does not necessarily reduce the belief in a spiritual world and religiosity need not preclude a belief in science.
High levels of secularization are also compatible with high levels of consumption of religious services. For example, Klausen argues that in, Western Europe, "The consumption of essential religious services -baptisms, confirmations, weddings, and funerals -has been remarkably resistant to change." (Klausen 2005: 139) . He points out that in Scandinavia, usually considered one of the most secularized regions in Table 4 . We found surprisingly high levels of support for the participation of religious professionals and institutions.
[ Table 4 
The Causes and Consequences of Religiosity
Why are some people more religious than others? I performed a simple logistic regression analysis on a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the respondent reports praying daily and 0 when she does not. The independent variables include four socioeconomic characteristics: standard of living (self-reported), level of education, age and gender. The first and most important finding is that the variance explained by these regressions is small, seldom reaching ten per cent. Socioeconomic characteristics do not reliably explain religiosity. It is, nevertheless, worth the effort to examine the significant correlations that do exist, remembering that all of the relationships are weak. Table 5 summarizes the relationships that meet the conventional 0.05 level of significance.
[ Table 5 about here]
We see first that women and older people tend to be more religious. This is a common finding but there are exceptions to both generalizations. We find no consistent relationship between standard and living or level of education and praying daily. Not only do we find a significant relationship in less than half of the countries analyzed, the direction varies by country. In Mongolia it is people with higher standards of living who are more likely to pray daily. In China and Japan, the less educated are more likely to pray every day but in Hong Kong and Pakistan it is the better educated who are more religious.
Are religious people different from secular people? We tend to assume that there are many clear and obvious contrasts but, in fact, we find few consistent differences. The Asia Barometer contains many questions the answers to which might be expected to differ between religious and secular respondents. I analyzed over thirty of these variables and found that religiosity, whether measured by frequency of prayer, religious identification, or spirituality, seldom had a statistically significant effect on any of them. Even the importance attached to religious services is not reliably explained by levels of religiosity, however measured. I did find one partial exception, albeit a theoretically important one.
Norris and Inglehart argue that "One of the most central injunctions of virtually all traditional religions is to strengthen the family, to encourage people to have children, to encourage women to stay home and raise children, and to forbid abortion, divorce, or anything that interferes with high rates of reproduction." (Norris and Inglehart 2004:23) . We should, therefore, expect to find that religious people to be opposed to abortion and homosexuality. I was encouraged when I found that, in secular East Asia at least, a regression explaining opposition to homosexuality did indeed explain more variance than any of the other analyses. However, the relationship between religiosity and opposition to homosexuality is neither clear nor consistent. I did find that, as predicted by Norris and Ingelhart, those respondents with a religious identification are more likely to oppose homosexuality, but the relationship is strong only in Hong Kong and Japan and absent elsewhere. The relationship with daily prayer is also significant in only two countries but is inconsistent in sign. In Hong Kong, those who pray daily are more likely to oppose homosexuality while in Taiwan they are less likely to do so. The most consistent finding is that those respondents who believe in a spiritual world are less likely to oppose homosexuality. Are religious people more likely than secular people to oppose homosexuality? It depends upon the national cultural and how religiosity is measured. In East Asia, there is no consistent relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward homosexuality.
In addition, I found no support at all for the hypothesis that religious people in secular East Asia are more likely to oppose abortion. This finding, however, does not necessarily refute the Norris and Inglehart hypothesis because, in East Asia, abortion is a traditional family value. In a Chinese-style family system, having too many daughters leads directly to financial ruin. In order to protect the family, the practice of "culling" excess children developed. This practice was considered perfectly natural: "the culling of humans, like that of rice seedlings, is so much in keeping with natural processes that it is all but necessitated." (LaFleur1992:100; see also Norgren 2001) . The East Asian cultural context is thus so different from that of Western Europe that one should not expect attitudes toward abortion to be determined by the same factors.
In sum, the message of these analyses, when combined with many other analyses including analyses of other data sets by other researchers, is clear: we do not understand the causes of individual variation in religiosity and we do not understand how religious people systematically differ from secular people. Much work remains to be done.
Discussion
Let me begin by recapping my major findings. First, South Asia is a very religious region while East Asia is an extremely secularized region of the world. This generalization holds with respect to the proportion of the population who claim a religious identity and the proportion that pray daily. Second, however, there are clearly many ways for a society to be either religious or secular. The highly secular societies of East Asia still have relatively high levels of spirituality and strong demand for religious ceremonies. Third, we find that women are more likely to be religious than are men and religiosity tends to be correlated with age.
The primary findings, however, are that levels of religiosity cannot be explained very well by socioeconomic characteristics and that levels of religiosity predict very little about other attitudes. What kinds of people are religious? It turns out that, on average, religious people do not differ much from secular people. If one cannot find many differences between religious and secular individuals in secular East Asia, where being religious involves a choice to set oneself apart from the norm, there is little reason to expect that we will ever find any major differences anywhere. In fact, clear and robust relationships between religiosity and any other characteristic or attitude are rare (Halman and Riis 2003; Carlson and Listhaug 2006) . These "non-findings" are both common and deeply surprising. When "normality" is surprising, it is time to stop and re-think.
When we view religion through the lens of the mass media religious people appear strikingly different from non-religious people and people from different religious traditions are strikingly different from one another. Though reporting varies widely by country, one common theme in the western media since 9-11 is that Muslims are all potential terrorists and suicide bombers. The mass media is not in the business of collecting scientifically reliable data. It is in the business of attracting readers, listeners, and viewers. The mass media reports on things that interest large numbers of people and the idea that religious people are much like everyone else does not fit the bill.
Stories of religious people doing things most people would find difficult or unimaginable sell newspapers. Stories of religious people acting just like everyone else are not newsworthy. Information provided by the mass media, therefore, suffer from serious selection biases.
When we view religion through the lens of academic case studies, religious people and institutions also look quite different from the secular people and institutions.
Here again, however, there is a selection bias in the religious institutions and people chosen for study. Academics may not be interested in the same topics as the average newspaper reader or television viewer, but they are equally uninterested in religious people and institutions that do not deviate from the norm. Political scientists are particularly interested in extreme religious groups (see, for example, Almond, Appleby and Sivan 2003) . Until recently political scientists accepted the idea that secularization would soon reduce religion to insignificance and therefore did not study the subject.
Interest was renewed only when religious groups found their way onto the front pages of newspapers and we therefore tend to study the groups that make headlines, reproducing, to a large degree, the selection bias of the mass media.
Based on these atypical cases, then, we formulate hypotheses that make perfect sense and then conduct surveys to demonstrate the accuracy of those predictions Europe may develop a set of common political attitudes but, whatever commonalities develop will be the result of experiences shared after emigrating to Europe, not the result of common religious beliefs or a common Muslim cultural heritage.
In any given neighborhood, and therefore in most people's personal experience, people from different faiths may well form meaningful social and political categories and religious people may well differ from secular people in socially and politically significant ways. Based on their own experience, therefore, any given individual tends to have a perfectly clear idea of how the religious differs from the secular. Yet, when we aggregate "religious people", no matter how defined, across many neighborhoods, and especially when our data cross national and regional boundaries, the homogeneity of the category disappears. The characteristics that distinguish the religious from the secular vary by neighborhood, by regions within nations, and most clearly across nations.
Distinctions that seem clear in any given neighborhood thus melt away in larger samples. The political relevance of religiosity depends upon the social and political context of locality in which it is studied. We should not expect to find many generalizations that hold up across national and regional boundaries. Entries are the percentage who answered either "Definitely" or "Somewhat". 
